One Tribe at a Time: The Paper that Changed the War in Afghanistan Read online

  ONE TRIBE AT A TIME

  JIM GANT

  US ARMY, RET.

  ONE TRIBE AT A TIME

  The paper that changed the war in Afghanistan

  JIM GANT

  US ARMY, RET.

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  INTRODUCTION BY STEVEN PRESSFIELD

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  ISBN: 978-1-936891-24-5

  EBOOK ISBN: 978-1-936891-25-2

  PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

  For Ghulam Nabi, known as Himmit to

  his friends and family. A great and kind

  man with a wonderful mind, his death in

  November 2011 a tragedy.

  INTRODUCTION

  Among the earliest readers of One Tribe at a Time was Gen. David Petraeus. One of the most recent was Osama bin Laden.

  Petraeus read One Tribe and told his staff, “Operationalize this.”

  Bin Laden read it and circled the author’s name on the title page. In the margin he wrote, “Kill this man.”

  I first met Special Forces Major Jim Gant in the summer of 2009. At the time I had a small website called “It’s the Tribes, Stupid.” The primary content on the site was five short videos that I had made with the intention of influencing policy in the Pentagon and the White House. I was hoping to get the decision-makers’ attention on the subject of how the US was employing its forces in Afghanistan.

  The message was, well … “It’s the tribes, Stupid.”

  Of course no one listened. No one even knew the site existed.

  Then I met Jim.

  The tribal concepts that I was talking about in theory, Jim had enacted in fact. He and I spent three days together at his home near Fort Bragg. Jim told me about leading Special Forces team ODA 316 in the Konar Valley in Afghanistan in 2003. He and his men had lived with the Mohmand tribe, had been taken in as brothers by the tribe’s leaders; Jim himself had virtually been adopted as a son by the tribal chief, Noor Afzhal.

  Was the US military’s current strategy in Afghanistan doomed to failure? Would a tribally-based strategy have a better chance? Did Jim have an idea what an effective T.E. (Tribal Engagement) design would look like?

  Yes, we concluded. And yes, and yes.

  “Jim,” I said, “you have to write it.”

  Jim of course had already worked it out in his head. The document would be a white paper, about fifty pages long.

  “If you write it,” I promised him, “I’ll bring it out on the website.”

  You always hope that something will go viral. Your aim is for a paper to get picked up and passed around.

  That’s what happened with One Tribe at a Time. Gen. James Mattis responded first, giving the paper a boost within the Marine Corps. Small Wars Journal picked it up next and added to the momentum. Even its detractors helped. A few high-snark attacks added to the paper’s visibility.

  Then Gen. Petraeus gave it his blessing.

  One Tribe at a Time changed policy.

  It also destroyed Jim Gant’s career.

  Jim’s story became the basis for the bestseller American Spartan: The Promise, the Mission, and the Betrayal of Special Forces Major Jim Gant by former Washington Post reporter Ann Scott Tyson.

  Alas, One Tribe did not change policy enough. It was too radical. Too disruptive to the battlespace owners. Too impractical within the sphere of Afghan-US politics. Tribal engagement was an idea whose time had not come, at least when implemented by conventional Army forces. But this short paper became a significant footnote in what will probably be the United States’ last intervention of choice in the heartland of any Islamic nation or predominantly tribal culture.

  Two final notes and I’ll let you get on to the meat of the book.

  1. The reason I came to believe, in the first place, that an understanding of tribes and the tribal mindset was essential to formulating a military and political strategy in Afghanistan was Alexander the Great. I studied Alexander’s history in the Afghan kingdoms in the 330s BCE. He and his army ran into the same buzz-saw that we Yanks blundered into. This was not hard to predict. A Western-style invasion force (whether Macedonian, Roman, Russian, or American) could expect fierce, unconventional resistance on the home turf of a primitive, tribe-based society.

  But here’s the interesting part: Alexander was pre-Christian and his enemies were pre-Islamic. What that said to me was that religion could be taken out of the equation in attempting to understand the fight on the ground in Afghanistan. We couldn’t chalk up our troubles to Islamic extremism or Islamo-fascism or Islamo-anything, because Islam didn’t exist in Alexander’s day. It wouldn’t appear for another 900 years.

  Tribalism.

  Tribalism was the common dynamic between the East-West clash then and the East-West struggle now.

  2. In the winter of 2010, Jim Gant and I, along with an Afghan tribal chief, Ajmal Khan Zazai, and our friend Michael McClellan, laid a brief siege to Washington DC, attempting to influence policy. We spoke at Marine Corps University and at Annapolis, gave a few interviews, and pleaded our case at several influential think tanks.

  At CNAS, the Center for a New American Security, Jim pitched his concept of Tribal Engagement to the full team of scholars including the distinguished author and foreign affairs expert Robert Kaplan and CEO and former Afghan-vet Recon Marine captain Nate Fick. It was clear to all in attendance that Major Gant could, if given the chance, pull off the Lawrence-of-Arabia-type stunt of embedding with an Afghan tribe and making a tribal engagement scenario work. But who else could do it? Did the army have a secret reserve of officers who could pull off this kind of miracle? Did the Marine Corps?

  Andrew Exum is a former Army Ranger captain with Afghan combat service (and author of This Man’s Army, as well as the much-followed counterinsurgency blog Abu Muqawama.) He is also a Fellow at CNAS.

  “Jim,” Andrew said that afternoon, “after listening to you speak and looking in your eyes, I have no doubt that you could insert yourself into a tribal environment in Afghanistan and make this kind of program work. But I don’t see how the United States can be realistically expected to back a policy that can only be implemented by geniuses.”

  Andrew was right. He had Jim pegged.

  Gen. Petraeus was right too. So was Osama bin Laden.

  Herewith: One Tribe at a Time.

  See if you agree.

  Steven Pressfield

  March 2014

  PREFACE

  “I emphasized at the beginning of this paper that I am neither a strategist nor an academic. I know there will be many criticisms that span all levels of war, from military personnel to pundits. But I also know this: I will get on a helicopter tonight, armed with an AK-47 and three hundred rounds of ammunition and put my life on the line and my strategy to the test.

  Will you do the same?”

  – One Tribe at a Time

  Major Jim Gant,

  US Army Special Forces

  October 2009

  The publication of One Tribe at a Time in October 2009 changed the course of my life and the lives of many others forever. In June 2010, I deployed
to Afghanistan for nearly two years, and, together with some great men, put into action the ideas in One Tribe at a Time.

  It worked.

  I learned a great deal—including how much I still don’t know. But I would without hesitation get on that same helicopter for Konar this very night, and do it again.

  Captain Jim Gant (US Army, Ret.)

  March 2014

  ONE TRIBE AT A TIME

  TABLE OF CONTENTS

  A Note To The Reader

  A Soldier’s Journey of Discovery

  Problems, Challenges, Questions

  Foreword

  Introduction

  Defining “Win”

  We Are Losing The War In Afghanistan

  Tribes Understand People, Protection, Power and Projection

  My Personal Experience With A Tribe In Konar Province

  Pashtunwali and Its Tactical Applications

  Six Problems With Current Coin Strategy and Its Application In Afghanistan

  Tribes and The “Enemy”

  How To Engage The Tribes

  Tribal Engagement Team Timeline

  Closing Thoughts

  Acknowledgments

  References

  A NOTE TO THE READER

  The thoughts and ideas that I will put forward in this paper are mine alone. Although I credit the US Army Special Forces for the training I have received and the trust of its commanders, nothing in this paper reflects the ideas and thinking of any other person or organization.

  I am not a professional writer. I am not implying by writing this paper that anyone has “got it wrong” or that I have all the right answers. I don’t.

  I started writing this paper in January of ’09 prior to the “New Afghanistan Plan.” Much has changed since then. It is an extremely difficult and elusive situation in Afghanistan.

  This paper is about tactical employment of small, well-trained units that, when combined with a larger effort, will have positive strategic implications.

  The following is a short list of terms you will see in this paper. I will define others as they appear:

  TET stands for “Tribal Engagement Teams.” I will go into detail about them in Chapter 8, but they are referred to in many places prior to that.

  TTE refers to “Tactical Tribal Engagement.”

  TES refers to “Tribal Engagement Strategy.”

  TSF refers to “Tribal Security Force.” I will also employ the word Arbakai next to it, as this is the Afghan term most used to describe the type of tribal element our TETs would “advise, assist, train and lead.”

  I am not here to imply that I think I could win the war in Afghanistan if put in charge. Or that I can meet these challenges alone, or that there aren’t soldiers out there who could do it better. I just know what I have done and what I could do again, if given the chance.

  Fight Tactically —

  Think Strategically

  A SOLDIER’S JOURNEY OF DISCOVERY

  Anytime I receive instruction from anyone, listen to someone speak, or read an article written by someone, my first question always is: Who are you? Why is what you are saying relevant? What is your background? What are your experiences? What are you getting out of what you are doing or saying or selling?

  So here are my answers to those questions. What do I consider my greatest military accomplishment? That I and the men I have trained and fought with have won twenty awards for valor. Twenty. That is a truly remarkable number. I had a great ODA (Operational Detachment Alpha) 316 in Afghanistan as part of the 3rd Special Forces Group. We fought together for several years in Afghanistan. We fought in the Konar and Helmand Provinces in early 2003 and again in 2004.

  I then spent two years on a Special Projects team before returning to Iraq as the first American combat advisor for an Iraqi National Police Quick Reaction Force (QRF) battalion. Our mission was to kill and capture terrorists anywhere in the country. I won a Silver Star and the Iraqi National Police Medal of Honor while fighting alongside my Iraqi brothers in 2006 and 2007 when Iraq was the most dangerous place on earth.

  I spent the next two years as an unconventional warfare (UW) instructor in the final phase of Special Forces training. After much red tape I was overjoyed to receive orders to return to Afghanistan in the summer of 2009 to once again spend time with the Afghan people and fight the Taliban. That is when I began writing this paper. A few days before leaving, I was informed that I would not be returning—I would be going to the 1st Armored Division to work on a transition team for a return trip to Iraq.

  My experiences since 9/11 have been incredible. I have fought with great warriors against worthy enemies in both Iraq and Afghanistan. We fought with exceptional bravery and courage at every turn, but we always fought smartly and were always prepared for the challenges we faced.

  This paper represents only a small portion of what ODA 316 accomplished in Afghanistan. It’s my story of the tribal engagement between myself and Malik Noor Afzhal, my team and the rest of his tribe.

  We must work first and forever with the tribes, for they are the most important military, political and cultural unit in that country. The tribes are self-contained fighting units who will fight to the death for their tribal family’s honor and respect. Their intelligence and battlefield assessments are infallible. Their loyalty to family and friends is beyond question.

  My unit and I became family members with Malik Noor Afzhal’s tribe. This is my story of what we accomplished as a family in mutual respect and purpose. I’m offering our experience as a blueprint for success.

  There is no doubt it could be done again.

  Major Jim Gant

  United States Army Special Forces

  We demonstrated month in and month out that a small effective fighting force could unite with an Afghan tribe, become trusted and respected brothers-in-arms with their leaders and families, and make a difference in the US effort in Afghanistan. In doing so, we discovered what I believe to be the seed of enduring success in that country.

  PROBLEMS, CHALLENGES, QUESTIONS

  The following are issues beyond the scope of this paper that would have to be addressed and dealt with to accomplish the goals set forth in these pages. I cite them in this space, up front, so that the reader understands that I am aware of them and of their importance and difficulty. I will not attempt to address these issues in this paper. The time and research required are simply beyond my pay grade. By themselves, these issues demand papers or even books.

  Beyond the strategy itself, what has to happen for a Tribal Engagement Strategy (TES) to work?

  A strategy of tribal engagement will require a complete shift at the highest levels of our military organization—and the ability to push these changes down to group/brigade and battalion commanders. I believe Secretary Gates, General Petraeus and General McChrystal are flexible and forceful enough to embrace a strategy of this type. My fear is that the farther down the “food-chain” it travels, the more it might be resisted by ground commanders.

  What specific tactical changes need to happen?

  Command and Control of the Tribal Engagement Teams (TETs) would have to be streamlined dramatically. “One radio call could get an answer.”

  The CONOP approval process (used to get missions approved from higher headquarters has to be streamlined. Some missions might have to be conducted with no approval, due to the time-sensitive nature of the opportunity. The TETs would need special “trust and approval.”

  The risk-averse nature of our current method of operating would have to change. American soldiers would die. Some of them alone, with no support. Some may simply disappear. Everyone has to understand that from the outset.

  TETs must be allowed to be on their own, grow beards, wear local garb, and interact with the tribesmen at all levels. They must be allowed to be what they are: “American tribesmen.”

  Use of OPFUND (money) needs to be streamlined. The TETs will need special trust to do what is needed with money allocated to help the trib
e. Money and guns equal the ultimate power.

  Rules of Engagement (ROE) must change. Using the TETs will become a very intense, personal fight. If they need to drop bombs or pursue an enemy, they must be able to do so. The teams will always fight alongside Tribal Security Forces (TSFs), and no missions will be conducted unilaterally. There will always be an Afghan face on any mission.

  2. Identifying, attracting and training American personnel who could perform this type of mission would be a daunting task.

  3. The strategic challenge of Pakistan as a sanctuary, recruiting base and source of funding and military expertise would have to be addressed. The United States cannot afford to destabilize Pakistan any more than it already is. However, a TES (Tribal Engagement Strategy) could positively influence this situation. Most Taliban funding, recruitment and training takes place in Pakistan. Not to mention the safe haven it provides.

  4. The lack of a viable judicial system. The current government-led judicial system is corrupt, slow and there are too few judges deemed legitimate by the populace to properly impose any rule of law in the vast and largely rural areas of Afghanistan. The Taliban has moved into many of these areas and gained footholds by dispensing justice, adjudicating disputes and acting as judges. It will take decades to improve this situation.

  5. The warlord issue in Afghanistan. Do we fight them? Pay them? Co-opt them? Use them as surrogates? Advise, assist and train them like we would do with the tribes? The warlords can definitely be used in a very effective surrogate role, in support of our objectives. We also need to understand that some fighters whom the US has labeled as “warlords” are really “environmentally-induced leaders” who fill a power vacuum of one type or another and that they would be very receptive to and even desirous of US assistance.

  6. The opium problem. The tie between opium and the funding of the Taliban is a fact. However, at the tactical level, it would be a mistake for US forces to get involved in this issue. To do so would make enemies out of a population that is simply struggling to feed its families, clans and tribes. The COIN (counterinsurgency) forces should not be made responsible for the opium issue. That would be counterproductive for the troops on the ground.